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The article critically engages with the reconfiguration of the role and status of 
national social spaces within the EU constitutional fabric after the reform of European 
economic governance. Its main contention is that these reforms have converted national 
social spaces into adjustment variables whose main function is to contribute to the 
pursuit of EMU-related objectives. This transformation alters the balance between the 
economic and the social dimension in the EU legal order, deforming one of the defining 
traits of its constitutional identity.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
National social spaces are the ensemble of national welfare systems and labour 
market policies characterized by distinct endowments of schemes and institutions, as 
well as by different logics and backgrounds.1 They are a key component of the 
European socio-economic architecture. Due to the lack of legal competences, financial 
resources and democratic credentials at supranational level to elaborate a substantive 
social policy, they are the only loci where ideate and carry out meaningful redistributive 
activities to “combat social exclusion and discrimination, […] promote social justice” 
and “social cohesion”, as provided for by Article 3 TEU. 
However, one of the most visible, and troubling, consequences of the Eurocrisis is 
the increasing inability of national social spaces to cope with the dramatic rise of 
poverty, social exclusion and economic inequality2 all over Europe and, in particular, in 
a number of southern States.3 This has negatively affected public opinion’s perception 
of the European integration process, since the EU is often singled out as the main culprit 
of the situation. On the one hand, this account, which has been eagerly embraced by 
blame-avoiding national politicians, offers a skewed picture of the reality, 
overemphasising the role played by supranational institutions in the process. On the 
other hand, it is hard to deny that the response to the crisis, and the ensuing reform of 
surveillance and financial assistance mechanisms, has had a bearing on the situation. 
Indeed, these mechanisms have been mostly modelled around certain core neoliberal 
policy prescriptions, such as budgetary austerity or the flexibilisation of labour markets 
                                                 
* University of Turin and Collegio Carlo Alberto. I would like to thank Matthias Goldmann, Agustin 
Menéndez, Alberto Miglio, Stefano Montaldo, Stefano Saluzzo, Harm Schepel, Andrea Spagnolo and 
Anna Viterbo for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this work. The article has been written 
in the context of the REScEU project (Reconciling Economic and Social Europe, www.resceu.eu), funded 
by the European Research Council (grant no. 340534). 
1 The notion and the definition are borrowed from M. Ferrera, ‘Social Europe and its Components in 
the Midst of the Crisis’, (2014) 37 West European Politics 825, 827-828. 
2 See the staggering data published in the World Inequality Report 2018 (available at 
http://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-full-report-english.pdf)  
3 See recently, OECD, The Socio-Economic Divide in Europe. Background Report, 26 January 2017, 
7-11. It is worth highlighting that, especially in peripheral countries, the crisis just deteriorated an 
economic situation that has been mostly characterized by slow, or even negative, economic growth and 
high unemployment rates since the 1980s.  
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and the repression of wage demands, which severely reduce the capacity of national 
social spaces to perform their redistributive functions.      
The article critically engages with the reconfiguration of the role and status of 
national social spaces within the EU constitutional fabric after the reform of European 
economic governance. Its main contention is that these reforms have converted national 
social spaces into adjustment variables whose main function is to contribute to the 
pursuit of EMU-related objectives. This transformation alters the balance between the 
economic and the social dimension in the EU legal order, deforming one of the defining 
traits of its constitutional identity.4 The analysis builds upon the burgeoning legal 
literature5 – and even meta-literature6 – on EU constitutional transformations in the 
aftermath of the Eurozone crisis. It does so by focusing on an aspect – the status of 
national social spaces in the EMU – that is still under researched, and by connecting it 
with other lines of inquiry, such as the one on the demise of the rule of law in Europe, 
which have received far more attention. Moreover, the analysis draws on political 
science works concerned with the role of national social spaces in the EU-building 
process, as well as with the tensions generated by the encounter between the two.7  
More in detail, the article first tracks the trajectory of national social spaces’ role and 
status within the European integration process, from the so-called ‘original 
compromise’ enshrined in the Treaty of Rome to the Lisbon Treaty’s attempt to 
reconcile the ‘economic’ and the ‘social’ within the supranational legal framework. The 
analysis then focuses on the early steps of the EMU and their potential impact upon 
national social spaces’ scope and functions. The third part of the article looks at the 
reform of European economic governance, starting from the strengthening of economic 
and social policies coordination mechanisms. The main point here is that, at least in its 
early cycles, the European Semester contributed much to the subordination of national 
social spaces to the strengthening of the EMU, paying scant attention to safeguarding 
their capacity to pursue core social objectives. This part of the analysis also considers 
the efforts to imbue the Semester with greater social sensitivity, claiming that the 
attempts to move away from the original one-sided approach are certainly promising, 
but still too limited. Lastly, the analysis turns to financial assistance programmes and 
the use of the conditionality policy therein. The analysis shows that, in this context, the 
above-described transformative process reached its apex, treating national social spaces 
just as a cost to be reduced or as a factor that must contribute to making the State 
concerned more competitive. The article takes a critical stance towards this approach 
and its implementing strategy centred on the creation of “empty constitutional spaces”8 
in order to insulate technocratic governance from political and legal responsibility. 
Likewise, the article criticizes some recent attempts to inject greater social sensitivity 
into both the procedure and the substance of structural adjustment programmes, 
                                                 
4 Claire Kilpatrick described this drift as a form of “displacement of Social Europe”. See C.Kilpatrick, 
‘The Displacement of Social Europe: A Productive Lens of Inquiry’, (2018) 14 European Constitutional 
Law Review 62. 
5 See, ex multis, M. Ioannidis, ‘Europe’s New Transformations: How the EU Economic Constitution 
Changed During the Eurozone Crisis’, (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 1237; F. De Witte and M. 
Dawson, ‘From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution for the EU’, (2015) 22 European Law Journal 
204. 
6 T. Beuker, Legal Writing(s) on the Eurozone Crisis, EUI Working Paper 2015/11; G. Martinico, EU 
Crisis and Constitutional Mutations: A Review Article, (2014) STALS Research paper No. 3; 
7 See recently M. Ferrera, ‘The JCMS Annual Lecture: National Welfare States and European 
Integration: In Search of a “Virtuous Nesting”’, (2009) 47 Journal of Common Market Studies 219. 
8 A.J. Menéndez Menéndez, ‘The Crisis and the European Crises: From Social and Democratic 
Rechtsstaat to the Consolidating State of (Pseudo-)technocratic Governance’, (2017) 44 Journal of Law 
and Society 56, 75. 
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showing their manifest inadequacy in restoring balance between the pursuit of EMU-
related objectives and the safeguarding of national social spaces.        
 
2. National social spaces within the European integration process: the 
trajectory from Rome to Lisbon 
 
2.1 The original compromise: the establishment of the internal market as a way to 
strengthen national social spaces 
The consolidation of territorially bounded social spaces in Europe has been 
described as the last phase in the development of the European system of nation States.9 
An important step in this direction was taken at the end of the nineteenth century, when 
a number of States10 introduced compulsory social insurance mechanisms.11 These 
programmes were strengthened after World War I and, in some countries, connected 
with a more intrusive public regulation of labour relations, so to contain mounting social 
tensions and avoid them developing into fully-fledged revolutionary movements.12 The 
post-World War II settlement cemented the place of welfare and labour policies at the 
core of European States’ constitutional identity. In the process, national social systems 
evolved from both a quantitative and, even more importantly, a qualitative perspective, 
going through their ‘golden age’.13 As for the quantitative dimension, the growth of 
social expenditure is a good proxy in this regard: European States’ social budgets went 
from 5% in 1940 to almost 30% of GDP in 1970.14 Coming to the qualitative 
dimension, welfare and labour policies became the centrepiece of post-war European 
States’ constitutional architecture, as duly reflected in the newly-adopted 
constitutions.15 In this context, social policy was no longer just a tool to address specific 
concerns, such as the relief of destitution or the maintenance of public order. The receipt 
of public welfare ceased to be stigma and a barrier to political participation,16 becoming 
a prerequisite for the effective exercise of citizenship rights. To this end, national 
welfare states extended their coverage, engaging in wide-scale redistributive efforts 
targeting not just the poor or specific typologies of risks. Post-war welfare states, 
                                                 
9 S. Bartolini, Restructuring Europe (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
10 Such as Austria (1887), Norway (1894), Finland (1895), Germany (1883) and Italy (1898).  
11 M. Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of 
Social Protection (Oxford University Press, 2005), 54, points out that ‘[s]ocial insurance was a real 
institutional breakthrough in the history of the European nation state’. 
12 This is the one of the reasons why these measures and the overall logic of the welfare state attracted 
severe criticism from the left. In the Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League 
(London, 1850), Marx and Engels pointed out that “the democratic petty bourgeois want better wages and 
security for the workers, and hope to achieve this by an extension of state employment and by welfare 
measures; in short, they hope to bribe the workers with a more or less disguised form of alms and to break 
their revolutionary strength by temporarily rendering their situation tolerable”. 
13 Ferrera, above, n. 11, at 77. 
14 S. Pierson, ‘Origins and Development of the Welfare State 1880-1975’, in S. Pierson (ed.), Beyond 
the Welfare State? The New Political Economy of Welfare (Polity Press, 1991), 108-109.  
15 The example of the Italian Constitution of 1948 stands out in this regard. Lelio Basso points out that 
the commitment toward the social development of the society represented the essence of the new 
democratic state, as well reflected in Article 3 of the Constitution. This provision reads as follows: “[è] 
compito della Repubblica rimuovere gli ostacoli di ordine economico e sociale, che, limitando di fatto la 
libertà e l'eguaglianza dei cittadini, impediscono il pieno sviluppo della persona umana e l'effettiva 
partecipazione di tutti i lavoratori all'organizzazione politica, economica e sociale del Paese”. See L. 
Basso, Il Principe senza scettro. Democrazia e sovranità popolare nella Costituzione e nella realtà 
italiana (Feltrinelli, 1958), 133.  
16 For instance, the Belgian law of 1894 universalising the suffrage explicitly excluded “les mendiants 
et vagabonds internes dans une maison de refuge […] par decision des juges de paix”. 
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although quite different one another,17 moved from partial and selective provision of 
social services to a comprehensive “cradle-to-grave” coverage of the population. The 
State played a key role in this process, progressively displacing the private provision of 
welfare and setting up a general institutional framework that shaped educational and 
employment opportunities. Post-war welfare states were conceived as collective 
undertakings based on a political decision rather than as an aggregate of individual 
rights.18 These comprehensive redistributive efforts mostly benefited the middle class,19 
facilitating the emergence of a broad majoritarian class20 and, by so doing, contributing 
to invigorate European States’ democratic credentials.      
The evolution described above helps to understand why European States were keen 
on guarding their ‘social sovereignty’ against any external intrusion. These concerns 
were very much present during the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Treaty of 
Rome of 1957 that established the European Economic Community (EEC). After an 
intense debate, the final decision was to exclude almost any possibility for the EEC to 
intervene in the social field.21 The only exception was the conferral of those social 
powers necessary to ensure the functioning of the internal market. For instance, the 
Council was entitled to adopt measures for the coordination of national social security 
systems to facilitate the free movement of workers.22 This led to a decoupling of the 
social and the economic spheres, leaving the former in Member States’ hands, while 
opening the latter to the intervention of the then EEC.  
Some commentators depicted the abstentionist approach embodied in the Treaty of 
Rome as the by-product of the founding fathers’ ‘social frigidity’.23 But a more careful 
analysis of the situation suggests the opposite: the choice to leave the social sphere 
beyond the reach of supranational institutions was meant to preserve Member States’ 
capacity to exercise their social prerogatives.24 Furthermore, the compromise rested on 
the assumption that the economic benefits deriving from the establishment of an 
integrated market would increase the redistributive capacity of national authorities, 
thereby contributing to the levelling up of social standards.25 In turn, ensuring that 
market forces were constrained in such a way as to invigorate national social spaces 
constituted the “constitutional-supranational raison d’être”.26 As pointedly observed by 
Giubboni, “[t]he institutional framework conceived by the founding fathers was […] 
totally in line with the cornerstones of embedded liberalism: the gradual 
institutionalization […] of free market principles at transnational level would be based 
                                                 
17 See G. Esping-Andrsen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton University Press, 
1990). 
18 R. Titmuss, ‘Welfare “Rights”, Law and Discretion’, (1971) 42 The Political Quarterly 113. More 
generally, see T. Judt, Postwar. The History of Europe Since 1945 (The Penguin Press, 2005), 360-389. 
19 R. Goodin and J. Le Grand, Not Only the Poor. The Middle Classes and the Welfare State (Unwin 
Hyman, 1987).  
20 S. Mau, Inequality, Marketization and the Majority Class: Why Did the European Middle-Classes 
Accept Neoliberalism? (Palgrave, 2015), 1-9. 
21 F. Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’, (2002) 40 
Journal of Common Market Studies 645, 645–648. 
22 Article 51 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957. 
23 G.F. Mancini, ‘Principi fondamentali di diritto del lavoro nell’ordinamento delle Comunità 
europee’, in Il lavoro nel diritto comunitario e l’ordinamento italiano (CEDAM, 1988), 33. 
24 See Report by a Group of ILO Experts (1956), Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation, 
Geneva: International Labour Office, para. 210. 
25 S. Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedoms in the European Constitution. A Labour Law 
Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 55. 
26 C. Joerges and F. Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, Formalized Law and the “Social Deficit” of European 
Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’, (2009) 15 European Law 
Journal 1, 5. 
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on the guarantee, non less secure for being implicit, of the preservation of strong and 
deeply rooted national welfare-state systems”.27  
 
2.2 The crisis of the original compromise and the infiltration of internal market law 
into national social spaces 
The compromise remained stable for little more than a decade. Then it began to 
falter due to a dramatic change in the economic and political background. The 
deterioration of the economic situation, due to the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, and the 
failure of the expansionary policies adopted by some States28 to cope with it, dealt the 
final blow to Keynesianism,29 in any of its varieties.30 At the end of the 1970s the 
neoliberal political project materialized and consolidated worldwide,31 thanks to the 
support of conservatives and social democrats alike.32 The new political project aimed 
at emancipating free markets from politics and society at large. Market liberalization 
was largely seen as the only remedy for the economic crises of the 1970s and, 
consequently, it returned to the top of political agendas.33 
This shift reverberated in the EU legal order, taking the form of a strong push 
toward completion of the internal market.34 In 1985 the Commission adopted a White 
Paper,35 which, despite claiming to be only “a programme and a timetable”36 for the 
achieving such objective, in reality it set in motion a momentous transformation of the 
European integration process.37 The White Paper identified the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers as the main step to be taken toward the creation of a fully integrated market, 
especially after the abolition of customs duties between Member States. The Single 
European Act provided supranational institutions with the legal means to pursue this 
                                                 
27 Giubboni, above, n. 25, at 17 (emphasis in the original). See also F. De Witte, ‘The Architecture of 
EU’s Social Market Economy’, in P. Koutrakos and J. Snell (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of the 
EU’s Internal Market (Edward Elgar, 2016), 121. 
28 This was the case of France, for instance: see J. Sachs and C. Wyplosz, ‘The Economic 
Consequences of President Mitterand’, (1986) 2 Economic Policy 262. 
29 W. Sandholtz, ‘Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht’, (1993) 47 International 
Organizations 1, 6-7.  
30 Coddington distinguished between 3 main approaches: the fundamentalist, the hydraulic and the 
reconstituted reductionist: see A. Coddington, ‘Keynesian Economics: The Search for First Principles’, 
(1976) 14 Journal of Economic Literature 1258. 
31 An important moment of this ideational evolution was the publication by the OECD of the so-called 
McCracken Report (see P. McCracken, Towards Full Employment and Price Stability, (OECD, 1977)). 
For a critical analysis of the Report see R. Kehoane, ‘Economics, Inflation, and the Role of the State: 
Political Implications of the McCracken Report’, (1978) 31 World Politics 108. The author presciently 
observed that the Report made a strong political argument, positing that democratic States were to 
discipline their citizens more effectively in order to conform to the requirements of capitalism.    
32 M. Goldmann, ‘The Great Recurrence. Karl Polanyi and the Crises of the European Union’, (2017) 
23 European Law Journal 272, 277 
33 L. Tsoukalis, The New European Economy Revisited (3rd ed) (Oxford University Press, 1997), 26-
28. 
34 S. Deakin, ‘Labour Law as Market Regulation. The Economic Foundations of European Social 
Policy’, in P. Davies, A. Lyon-Caen, S. Sciarra, S. Simitis (eds), Principles and Perspectives on EC 
Labour Law. Liber Amicorum for Lord Wedderburn (Oxford University Press, 1996), 70. 
35 European Commission, Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from the Commission to the 
European Council, 14 June 1985, COM(85) 310 final.  
36 Ibidem., 4. 
37 C.D. Ehlermann, ‘The “1992 Project”: Stages, Structures, Results and Prospects’, (1990) 11 
Michigan Journal of International Law 1097, 1103. The author pointedly observed that “[t]he ‘1992 
Project’ has radically changed the European Community. It has given the ‘common market’ new impetus 
and has lifted the Community out of the deep crisis in which it was bogged down in the first half of the 
1980’s”.  
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aim by introducing qualified majority voting for the adoption of internal market 
measures under Article 100a EEC. Once again, this reform was presented as only a 
minor, even technocratic step, couched in terms of a residual procedure to be used only 
“[b]y way of derogation from Article 100 EEC and save where otherwise provided in 
this Treaty”. However, when considered in retrospect, the impact of this reform was 
considerable from many points of view.38 With specific regard to the issue under 
discussion, it enhanced the capacity of supranational institutions to affect and constrain 
national political decisions in fields falling in Member States’ exclusive preserve, such 
as the social one.  
Stronger constraints on Member States’ social autonomy came from the judicially-
induced ‘infiltration’39 of internal market rules into the social sphere. From the 1990s 
onwards, the Court started to assess the compatibility of key components of national 
social spaces with the functioning of a competitive internal market. A first strain on 
national social regimes derived from the attempt to apply competition rules40 to public 
insurance monopolies and to the principle of compulsory membership. Equally 
troublesome was the application of the norms on the free movement of labour and 
services to national arrangements, limiting the access to welfare benefits and services.41 
Other battlegrounds were the application of EU State aid norms to the compensation 
granted by national authorities to welfare services providers,42 as well as by the recourse 
to the rules on freedom of establishment against the restrictions imposed by Member 
States on the access of private enterprises to their domestic ‘social’ markets.43 Problems 
also arose with regard to the interplay between free movement of services and national 
labour legislation, generating a number of cases touching upon Member States’ capacity 
to impose their own minimum labour standards on workers posted to their territory by 
enterprises established in other Member States,44 even in cases where the execution of a 
public contract was at stake.45 
The infiltration of internal market law into national social spaces put under pressure 
                                                 
38 J. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, (1991) 100 The Yale Law Journal 2403, 2461-2463. 
39 G. Lyon-Caen, ‘L’infiltration du droit du travail par le droit de la concurrence’, (1992) Droit 
ouvrier 313.  
40 See, among others, Judgment of 17 February 1993, Poucet et Pistre, Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91; 
Judgment of 16 November 1995, FFSA, Case C-244/94; Judgment of 21 September 1999, Albany, Case 
C-67/96; Judgment of 22 January 2002, Cisal, Case C-218/00; Judgment of 16 March 2004, AOK 
Bundesverband, Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01, C-355/01. 
41 Judgment of 28 April 1998, Kohll, Case C-158/96; 12 July 2001, Smits and Peerbooms, Case C-
157/99; Judgment of 13 May 2003, Müller-Fauré and Van Riet, Case C-385/99; Judgment of 16 May 
2006, Watts, Case C-372/04; Judgment of 9 October 2014, Petru, C-268/13. For a detailed analysis of the 
case law on patients’ mobility see J. Baquero Cruz, ‘The Case Law of the European Court of Justice on 
the Mobility of Patients’, in J. van de Gronden, E. Szyszczak, U. Neergaard and M. Krajewski (eds), 
Health Care and EU Law (TMC Asser Press, 2011), 79-102. 
42 Judgment of 12 February 2008, BUPA, Case T-289/03. 
43 Judgment of 11 September 2008, Commission v Germany (Hospital pharmacies), Case C-141/07; 
Judgment of 10 March 2009, Hartlauer, Case C-169/07. 
44 Judgment of 18 December 2007, Laval, C-341/05; Judgment of 18 December 2007, Viking, C-
438/05; Judgment of 3 April 2008, Rüffert, C-346/06; Judgment of 18 June 2008, Commission v. 
Luxembourg, C-319/06. These cases prompted an intense debate that has been reviewed by C. Barnard, 
‘The Calm After the Storm: Time to Reflect on EU (Labour) Law Scholarship Following the Decisions in 
Viking and Laval’, in A. Bogg, C. Costello, A.C.L. Davies (eds), Research Handbook on EU Labour Law 
(Edward Elgar, 2016), 337-362.  
45 See F. Costamagna, ‘Minimum Wage in EU Law Between Public Procurement and Posted 
Workers: Anything New Under the Sun After the RegioPost Case?’, (2017) 1 European Law Review 101; 
A. Koukiadaki, ‘The Far-Reaching Implications of the Laval Quartet: The Case of the UK Living Wage’, 
(2015) 43 Industrial Law Journal 91; C. Kilpatrick, Internal Market Architecture and the 
Accommodation of Labour Rights: As Good as It Gets?, EUI Working Paper LAW 2011/04. 
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the division of social competences between supranational and national authorities. The 
Court brought to an end the double-track model and contributed to further limiting 
Member States’ margins of manoeuvre in a field formally their exclusive preserve. The 
Kohll judgment, concerning an early case on the free circulation of patients, provides an 
apt example in this regard. Faced with the question of whether Treaty provisions on the 
free movement of services could apply in the field of social security, the Court reframed 
it by saying that the problem was not whether the application of these rules could 
encroach upon national competences, but whether the exercise of the latter could 
impede the free movement of services’ beneficiaries. Indeed, while first acknowledging 
that “Community law does not detract from the powers of the Member States to 
organise their social security systems”, it added that “Member States must nevertheless 
comply with Community law when exercising those powers”.46 Therefore, gone was the 
stark distinction between the economic and social spheres, since the latter, although still 
formally within Member States’ exclusive competence, was fully embedded in the 
former.  
 
2.3 Reconciling the ‘economic’ and the ‘social’ within the EU legal order 
The evolution described above was perceived as a force that could encroach upon 
domestic social solidarity institutions,47 driving a de-structuring wedge therein. The 
strain between the economic and social dimensions is profound. It originates from a 
clash between two opposing logics: on the one hand, the process of economic 
integration rests upon a logic of openness; on the other, national social spaces are 
founded upon a logic of closure.48 In particular, as explained by Ferrera, redistributive 
regimes presuppose “the existence of a clearly demarcated and cohesive community, 
whose members feel that they belong to same whole and that they are linked by 
reciprocity ties vis-à-vis common risks and similar needs”.49 Viewed from an internal 
market perspective, these spatial demarcations are just restrictions that need to be 
removed in order to create an integrated and competitive market space. 
Member States’ reaction to the judicially-induced infiltration materialized in Treaty 
reforms that, apparently, tried to reinstate and reinforce the old division of labour, so to 
insulate their social spaces “from the pressures generated from the functioning of the 
internal market”.50 This is the case if one looks at the choice to confirm that 
redistributive functions and the regulation of labour markets still are, by and large, they 
exclusive preserve. Or, in those cases where steps were taken in the opposite direction, 
Member States sought to retain the last word in any case. For instance, the Treaty of 
Lisbon modified Article 48 TFEU, replacing unanimity with qualified majority voting 
for the adoption of social security measures relating to the free circulation of workers. 
At the same time, it also introduced an emergency brake enabling each Member State to 
halt the legislative process when a draft legislative act “would affect important aspects 
                                                 
46 Kohll, paras. 17-19. See generally L. Azoulai, ‘The “Retained Powers” Formula in the Case Law of 
the European Court of Justice: EU Law as Total Law?’, (2011) 4 European Journal of Legal Studies 192. 
47 C. Joerges, ‘A Renaissance of the European Economic Constitution?’, in U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen 
and L.M. Roseberry (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law (Djøf Publishing, 2009), 37–51. 
48 For an in-depth analysis of the impact of European integration upon national welfare states see S. 
Liebfried and P. Pierson, ‘Semisovereign Welfare States: Social Policy in a Multitiered Europe’, in S. 
Liebfried and P. Pierson (eds), European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration 
(Brooking Institution Press, 1995), 43–77. 
49 M. Ferrera, ‘Friends, not Foes: European Integration and National Welfare States’, URGE Working 
Paper, No. 10/2006, 3. 
50 De Witte, above, n. 27, at 125. 
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of its social security systems, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would 
affect the financial balance of that system”. 
Other reforms sought to strengthen the position of national social spaces in the EU 
constitutional constellation. This is the case, first of all, of the new Article 3 TEU, 
which gives enhanced visibility to a host of social objectives and put them on a par with 
economic ones, such as the establishment of the internal market or of the EMU. In the 
absence of the conferral to the EU of new powers to pursue these objectives, this 
provision has to be interpreted as meaning that there is no hierarchy between the two set 
of objectives in the EU legal order and, thus, conflicts are to be solved through a 
balancing exercise.51 This duty is codified by Article 9 TFEU, which establishes, in an 
admittedly less-than-clear fashion, that EU institutions are bound “to take into account 
requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of 
adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion and a high level of 
education, training and protection of human health” when acting. A similar balancing 
function can also be performed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and, in particular, 
by the social rights contained therein. Despite their often uncertain wording, these 
provisions could represent a buffer against the disruptive effects that the application of 
EU rules can have on the functioning of internal market spaces.  
These reforms have the merit of potentially restating the pluralistic character of the 
European economic constitution,52 imposing the duty to solve these conflicts by finding 
a balance between competing objectives and values that are ranked equally within the 
EU constitutional order.53 The key question is whether the new constitutional 
constellation nested national social spaces within the supranational order by providing 
“an environment that allows [their] survival and development”54 or “absorbed [them] 
into the province where European constitutional law acts as a disciplinary force”.55 
Much depends on the capacity of decision-makers to systematically mobilize the 
new tools and, even more crucially, on the Court’s approach when it comes to balancing 
the economic and the social. As for the latter, the analysis of the case law does not offer 
many reasons for hope. The Court often resorted to “hierarchical balancing”,56 drifting 
toward the adoption of what has been pointedly described as “total market thinking”.57 
The most conspicuous examples in this regard are the Viking and Laval cases.58 As 
openly recognized by AG Trstenjak in Commission v. Germany, “[t]he approach 
adopted in Viking Line and Laval un Partneri” on the relationship between the right to 
                                                 
51 As explicitly recognized by the Court in a case concerning the compatibility of the Greek legislation 
on collective redundancies with Article 49 TFEU, the granting of equal constitutional status to the two 
sets of objectives requires balancing “the rights under the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital […] against the objectives pursued by social policy” (see 
Judgment of 21 December 2016, AGET Iraklis, Case C-201/15, paras 76-77). This did not deter the Court 
from finding that the Greek legislation was incompatible with Article 49 TFEU for imposing criteria for 
the authorization of collective redundancies that are too imprecise and, thus, for failing to comply with 
the proportionality principle. 
52 C. Kaupa, The Pluralist Character of the European Economic Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2016). 
53 M. Dawson and B. De Witte, ‘Welfare Policy and Social Inclusion’, in A. Arnull and D. Chalmers 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2015), 965-966. 
54 Ferrera, above, n. 7, at 223-226. 
55 L. Niglia, ‘Eclipse of the Constitution. Europe Nouveau Siècle’, (2016) 22 European Law Journal 
132, 138. 
56 Ibid., 154. 
57 E. Christodoulidis, ‘The European Court of Justice and “Total Market Thinking’”, (2013) 14 
German Law Journal 2005, 2011. See also Joerges and Rödl, above, n. 26.  
58 See recently S. Giubboni, ‘Freedom to Conduct a Business and EU Labour Law’, (2018) 14 
European Constitutional Law Review 172, 179-180 arguing that “Viking and Laval inaugurate the season 
of the Court’s dominant neoliberal dogmatism”. 
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take collective action and free circulation of services “sits uncomfortably alongside the 
principle of equal ranking for fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms 
[suggesting] the existence of a hierarchical relationship between fundamental freedoms 
and fundamental rights in which fundamental rights are subordinated to fundamental 
freedoms”.59 This is not to deny that there are other cases where the Court avoided 
market fundamentalism, accepting that economic objectives can yield to social ones and 
national preferences.60 Yet, even in these cases, the Court keeps on starting from the 
ends of economic freedoms, which is no longer necessary if the above-mentioned 
Treaty reforms are to be taken seriously.  
 
3. National social spaces within the EMU 
The push toward completion of the internal market was intimately linked with 
another important step in the integration process, i.e. the establishment of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU).61 Since its inception, it was clear that the creation of the 
EMU would involve “a huge transfer of power from the national to the EU level”62 
negatively affecting social policies, which could end up being “the very likely victim of 
EMU”.63 As duly observed in the Delors Report of 1989, the creation of the EMU 
would increase economic interdependence and, thus, “reduce the room for independent 
policy manoeuvre and amplify the cross-border effects of developments originating in 
each member country”.64 Therefore, in the absence of a truly common economic policy, 
there was the need to place national decisions “within an agreed macroeconomic 
framework and be subjected to binding procedures and rules”.65 Yet, the Delors Report 
warned that these efforts could not be enough to ward off the risk that the creation of a 
single currency area, founded on full capital mobility, could aggravate the imbalances 
existing between Member States, negatively affecting “peripheral regions”.66 
Consequently, the Report emphasised the need for the adoption of “countervailing 
policies” at supranational level in order to compensate Member States’ loss, as a result 
                                                 
59 Opinion of AG Trstenjak of 14 April 2010, Commission v. Germany, C-271/08, paras 183-184. For 
a critical view on the ‘equal ranking’ doctrine see Goldmann, above, n. 32, at 280.  
60 See, for instance, judgment of 11 December 2014, Spezzino, C-113/13. For a critical analysis of the 
decision of the Court, see R. Caranta, ‘After Spezzino (Case-C-113/13): A Major Loophole Allowing 
Direct Awards in the Social Sector’, (2016) European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law 
Review 14. 
61 The necessity of EMU for completion of the Internal Market is often explained by referring to the 
so-called “impossible trinity” principle, according to which “full capital mobility and exchange rates 
fixity remove the ability to conduct an independent monetary policy. Under the assumption that the 
exchange rate stability is seen as a condition for the smooth working of the Common Market, it follows 
that all countries except one have lost de facto monetary policy independence. The monetary union 
recognizes this fact and makes sure that no country will mistakenly challenge the impossible trinity 
principle” (C. Wyplosz, ‘The European Monetary Union. The Dark Sides of a Major Success’, (2006) 21 
Economic Policy 207, 212).  
62 P. Teague, ‘Monetary Union and Social Europe’, (1998) 8 Journal of European Social Policy 117, 
118-119. 
63 D. Bouget, ‘Social Policy in the EMU: Between a Dream and a Nightmare’, (1998) 1 Transfer 67, 
75. 
64 Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (Delors Report), Report on Economic 
and Monetary Union in the Community, 1989, 10. 
65 Ibid., 14. 
66 Ibid., 18. Quite remarkably, the Padoa-Schioppa Report of 1987 had already warned against the 
“serious risk of aggravated regional imbalances” through market integration, calling for the strengthening 
of allocative and, even more importantly, redistributive functions at supranational level. See T. Padoa-
Schioppa, Efficiency, Stability and Equity. A Strategy for the Evolution of the Economic Strategy of the 
European Community. A Report of a Study Group Appointed by the Commission of the European 
Communities (European Commission, 1987), 4. 
 10 
of EMU, of the monetary levers with which to address financial imbalances. As a 
consequence, Member States should put the Community in the position of promoting 
“an optimum allocation of resources and […] spread welfare gains throughout the 
Community”, enlarging the size of regional funds to use them to equalize production 
conditions through investment programmes “in such areas as physical infrastructures, 
communications, transportation and education”.67 
With the benefit of hindsight, one cannot but regret that the establishment of the 
EMU focused more on the first aspect, the creation of a macroeconomic framework of 
binding rules and procedures, than on the second, the need to confront structural 
imbalances.68 The framework revolved around a set of criteria, concerning public deficit 
and debt, enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).69 Budgetary constraints 
were binding on Member States, which could be ultimately sanctioned for failing to 
respect them.70 Budgetary discipline was complemented by the establishment of 
mechanisms for the coordination of Member States’ economic and social policies. This 
coordinative form of governance, traditionally known as Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC), had a soft character, being a voluntary process for political cooperation based 
on agreeing common objectives and measuring progress towards these goals using 
common indicators.71 Their soft nature allowed supranational institutions – and, in 
particular, the European Commission – to exert their influence, which varied 
considerably from process to process, in fields falling outside EU competencies and, 
thus, beyond the limits set by the principle of conferral.72 
Both components of the framework were set to have a potentially profound impact 
on national social spaces. On the one hand, budgetary constraints aimed at limiting 
Member States’ capacity to play “Keynes at home”, forcing them, in particular, to cut 
down on one of the heaviest items in their budgets, i.e. social expenditure.73 On the 
other, most of the policy coordination processes touched upon, directly or indirectly, 
social issues. Indeed, after being first used with regard to economic policies,74 the OMC 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 18-19. What the Delors Report seems oblivious to is the massive shift of power toward the 
supranational level that this would have caused. On this point see P. Baffi, ‘Il sistema monetario europeo 
e la partecipazione dell'Italia, testo dell'audizione del governatore della Banca d'Italia alla Commissione 
Finanze e Tesoro del Senato del 26 ottobre’, (1978) 2 Thema 7. 
68 F. Amtenbrink, ‘The Methamorphosis of European Economic and Monetary Union’, in Arnull and 
Chalmers, above, n. 53, at 722. 
69 Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact (Amsterdam, 17 June 1997), 
OJ C 236 of 02.08.1997; Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ L 219 
of 02.08.1997. 
70 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ L 209 of 02.08.1997. 
71 See K.A. Armstrong, The Open Method of Coordination – Obstinate or Obsolete?, University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 45/2016. 
72 For an early critical take on this aspect, see L. Cram, ‘Calling the Tune without Paying the Piper? 
Social Policy Regulation and the Role of the Commission in European Community Social Policy’, (1993) 
21 Policy & Politics 135. 
73 See A. Vedun, ‘An Asymmetrical Economic and Monetary Union in the EU: Perceptions of 
monetary Authorities and Social Partners’, (1996) 20 Journal of European Integration 59. Back in the 
mid-‘90s, the Author conducted interviews with politicians and experts on the upcoming monetary union, 
revealing that many of them backed the creation of the EMU just because it “would offer legitimacy for 
restructuring the expensive welfare states”. 
74 Finding a legal basis in the Treaty in what is now Article 121 TFEU. The provision establishes that 
“Member States shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and shall coordinate 
them within the Council”. 
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then spread to the field of employment policy75 and, later, to social inclusion, pensions 
and healthcare.76   
Despite being seemingly very intrusive into national decisional autonomy, in reality 
the mechanisms described above were designed to preserve some space for national 
politics.77  
On the one hand, SGP fell victim to its “design faults and cardinal sins” purposely 
introduced by Member States to avoid that the Union could effectively “interfere with 
one of their core policy areas, that is, to decide upon government expenditure and 
taxation or, in short, their budgetary freedom”.78 A good example in this regard is the 
choice to entrust the Council with the authority to adopt a number of key decisions in 
the process, such as, for instance, the one approving a sanction against a State failing to 
meet the budget target or breaching the deficit criterion. This gave Member States the 
ultimate say on decisions that one day could come back to haunt them. Therefore, it 
comes as little surprise that Member States have mostly used these prerogatives to 
safeguard their present and future interests, rather than to ensure strict compliance with 
the rules. In 2003, for instance, the ECOFIN brushed aside Commission 
recommendations requiring France and Germany to bring their deficits under the 3 
percent threshold by the following year.79 This choice, motivated by the need to avoid 
pushing the whole Eurozone into recession, deepened the rift between large Member 
States and small ones.80 It eventually led to a reform of the SGP in 2005 that relaxed the 
requirements, adding a little more flexibility.81 
On the other hand, coordination mechanisms failed to force Member States to 
reform their social spaces to make them converge toward a set of goals, such as 
increasing labour flexibility, modernizing social protection systems or creating an 
“active and dynamic welfare state”.82 This was, at least, the perception of the European 
                                                 
75 The European Employment Strategy was launched in November 1997 at the Luxembourg European 
Council, after the Amsterdam Treaty had laid the basis for that step. See generally D. Ashiagbor, The 
European Employment Strategy (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
76 In 2006, the social inclusion, pensions and healthcare processes were streamlined into a single 
Social OMC (European Commission, A New Framework for the Open Coordination of Social Protection 
and Inclusion Policies, COM(2005)706, 22.12.2005). The Lisbon Strategy (European Council, Lisbon 
Presidency Conclusions, 23-24 March 2000) represented a breakthrough for this development, since it 
gave stronger visibility to social policy within the integration process and it formally introduced the OMC 
as a new governance tool. See generally K.A. Armstrong, Governing Social Inclusion: Europeanization 
through Policy Coordination (Oxford University Press, 2010).   
77 J. Snell, ‘The Trilemma of European Economic and Monetary Integration, and Its Consequences’, 
(2016) 22 European Law Journal 157, 160-164. 
78 R. Palmstorfer, ‘The Reverse Majority Voting Under the ‘Six Pack’: A Bad Turn for the Union?’, 
(2014) 20 European Law Journal 186, 188-191.  
79 Decision 2003/89/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Germany—Application of Article 
104(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ L34 of 11.02.2003; Decision 
2003/487/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in France—Application of Article 104(6) of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ L165 of 03.07.2003. On 25 November 2003, the 
Council voted on the recommendations, failing to reach the required majority. The Commission brought 
an action of annulment against the non-decision of the Council, but the Court dismissed it (see Judgment 
of 13 July 2004, Commission v. Council, C-27/04, paras. 25-36).  
80 Editorial Comments, ‘Whither the Stability and Growth Pact?’, (2004) 41 Common Market Law 
Review 1193, 1194. 
81 Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on 
the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of 
economic policies, OJ L174 of 07.07.2005 and Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
deficit procedure, OJ L174 of 07.07.2005. 
82 Lisbon Presidency Conclusions, above, n. 76, at 24.  
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Commission, which, for instance, in 2008 expressed its frustration with the inadequate 
results achieved in the field of social policy coordination and, in particular, in the 
domain of pension reforms.83 An exhaustive assessment of the merits and demerits of 
the OMC falls well beyond the scope of this article. However, such a negative 
assessment is worth careful consideration, since it reveals how, especially starting from 
the launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, the Commission changed its view on the 
OMC. Rather than considering it just as a process of reflexive harmonization based on 
mutual learning and policy exchange, aimed at opening up space for autonomy and 
differentiation,84 it came to regard it as a tool that should be able to force national social 
spaces into a more market-oriented and EMU-friendly mould. Or, to use the words of 
Chalmers and Lodge, to push further the process of “colonization of the welfare state by 
the economic policy making process”,85 circumventing the limits posed by the principle 
of conferral.   
 
4. The reform of the European economic governance and the impact on 
national social spaces: the case of the European Semester 
The leniency of budgetary constraints and the ineffectiveness of economic policy 
coordination mechanisms have often been regarded as indirect causes of the crisis, 
allowing some States, especially Southern ones, to overspend on social welfare and to 
procrastinate the reform of their social protection systems and labour market. The 
Commission, together with some Member States, touted this narrative, which, 
disregarding EMU’s structural defects, laid the groundwork for and inspired subsequent 
reforms.  
First, in 2011 the EU adopted a package of six legal acts, commonly referred to as 
the Six-Pack, reforming SGP’s preventive and corrective arms. Procedurally, one of the 
main objectives of this reform was to give more power to supranational institutions and, 
in particular, to the Commission, by taking it away from the Council.86 The introduction 
of minority voting in various stages of the procedure87 goes exactly in this direction,88 
making it more difficult for Member States to gather enough support to block the 
adoption of a Commission’s recommendation. Substantively, the reform aimed at 
expanding the scope of supranational control beyond debt and deficit, so as to take into 
account macroeconomic imbalances and competitiveness developments. In particular, 
Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011 and Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011 introduced a new 
procedure, largely modelled after the SGP, that should allow for an early detection and 
correction of imbalances heightening the financial vulnerability of Member States and 
of the euro area as a whole.   
Second, and this will be the main focus of the next sub-sections, the EU has sought 
to strengthen the coordination of economic policies with the creation of the European 
                                                 
83 European Commission, A Renewed Commitment to Social Europe: Reinforcing the Open Method of 
Coordination for Social Protection and Social Inclusion, COM(2008)418 final, 22 July 2008, 2. 
84 Giubboni, above, n. 25, at 119. 
85 D. Chalmers and M. Lodge, The Open Method of Co-ordination and the European Welfare State, 
ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, Discussion Paper No. 11/2003, 14 
86 For a critical account of the reforms introduced by the Six-Pack see D. Adamski, ‘National Power 
Games and Structural Failures in the European Economic Governance’, (2012) 49 Common Market Law 
Review 1336. 
87 Article 7 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union extended the use of this voting procedure, committing the Contracting Parties whose currency is 
the euro “to support the proposals or recommendations submitted by the European Commission where it 
considers that a Member State of the European Union whose currency is the euro is in breach of the 
deficit criterion in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure” 
88 Palmstorfer, above, n. 78, at 91-94. 
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Semester. Despite showing many elements of continuity with past OMC processes, the 
new framework seeks to address some of their perceived organizational and ideational 
shortcomings.  
 
4.1 Social and Labour Soft Policy Coordination under the Shadow of Hard Law 
Processes within the European Semester 
Procedurally, the Semester brings under the same umbrella different strains of EU 
policy coordination and surveillance that touch upon both economic and social policies. 
The creation of a hybrid meta-coordination framework, yoking together hard and soft 
law processes, allegedly aimed at increasing consistency among instruments that have 
different legal bases and rely upon distinct enforcement mechanisms. In reality, the 
main objective was to put hard law mechanisms at the service of soft coordinative 
governance tools, in order to strengthen the capacity of supranational institutions of 
making national authorities comply with guidelines and recommendations touching 
upon subject matters, such as pensions and wage-setting mechanisms, that fall within 
national competences.89 From a normative standpoint, the choice to put coercion at the 
service of flexible arrangements is problematic. 
The Semester rests upon three main pillars, namely the Europe 2020 Integrated 
Guidelines, the Stability and Growth Pact and the Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure (MIP). It starts in November, when the Commission adopts the Annual 
Growth Survey (AGS), whose content, after being endorsed by the European Council, 
should feed into Member States’ National Reform Programmes (NRPs) and Stability or 
Convergence Programmes (SCPs). In May, the Commission evaluates national reform 
and fiscal plans and it issues Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) that set out 
the actions to be taken by the concerned State. In July, CSRs are finally approved by the 
ECOFIN Council. The approval of ‘the Two-Pack’90 and, in particular, the adoption of 
Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013 added a further step to the Semester, at least with regard 
to Euro States. Indeed, since 2013 the latter have been required to submit to the 
Commission by 15 October a draft budgetary plan for the following year. This allows 
the Commission to look into the measures proposed by national Governments at a 
moment in which these measures, and their modes of implementation, are discussed by 
national parliaments. The Commission has the power to step into the debate and, should 
it identify serious non-compliance with SGP obligations, even request the State 
concerned to submit a revised plan within three weeks.91 
The combination of hard and soft mechanisms enhances supranational institutions’ 
capacity to exercise policy formulation, supervision and guidance on issues concerning 
the organization and functioning of national social spaces.92 As seen above, this does 
                                                 
89 M. Dawson, ‘New Governance and the Displacement of Social Europe: The Case of the European 
Semester’, (2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 191, 197-199. See, more in general, F. 
Amtenbrink and R. Repasi, ‘Compliance and Enforcement in Economic Policy Coordination in EMU’, in 
A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values. Ensuring Member States’ 
Compliance (Oxford University Press, 2017), 145-181. 
90 Composed of two different legislative measures, both addressing Euro States only: a Regulation 
(EU) No. 472/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of 
economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with 
serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability [2013] OJ L140/1 and Regulation (EU) No. 
473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for 
monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the 
Member States in the euro area [2013] OJ L140/11.  
91 Art 6 of Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013.   
92 See generally S. Bekker, European socioeconomic governance in action: Coordinating social 
policies in the third European Semester, OSE Paper Series No. 19/2015; F. Costamagna, ‘The Impact of 
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not represent an absolute novelty in the EU legal order, since EU institutions were able 
to exercise these functions in the context of already-existing soft policy coordination 
processes. However, the new framework is not a mere sum of past soft law processes: 
coordination activities are now carried out under the shadow of hard law measures, or 
even financial sanctions for Euro States, that can be adopted against those member 
States that fail to comply with the recommendations. Chalmers described it as a process 
of co-government that “goes to the structure and rationale of a State’s fiscal and welfare 
systems”.93 Admittedly, this may seem an overstatement if measured against the 
implementation of recommendations at national level, which, as lamented by the 
Commission in the AGS 2017, is still “disappointing”.94 However, the notion well 
captures the potential of a process that combines the breadth and specificity of soft 
coordination mechanisms with the stealth of surveillance procedures having a hard law 
nature. This emerges very clearly if one considers CSRs dealing with social and labour 
policy issues.  
These acts are not just “broad guidelines” as provided for by Article 121 TFEU, 
being very specific in identifying the measures to be adopted and the results to be 
achieved. Rather than broad guidelines, many of the recommendations look like narrow 
paths not allowing for any deviation from what EU institutions – and the Commission, 
in particular – consider as the ‘right way’ toward salvation. For instance, in 2015 Ireland 
was recommended to “[t]ake measures to increase the cost-effectiveness of the 
healthcare system, including by reducing spending on patented medicines and gradually 
implementing adequate prescription practices. Roll out activity-based funding 
throughout the public hospital system”.95 Likewise, in 2016 Austria was asked to 
“[e]nsure the sustainability of the healthcare system, and of the pension system by 
linking the statutory pension age to life expectancy”.96  
These recommendations obliterate national authorities’ autonomy, leaving non-
compliance as the only possible way out. Yet, this option is not readily available to all 
Member States. Despite nominally retaining a non-binding character, these 
recommendations engender a level of compliance that is higher than the one that may be 
inferred from Article 288 TFEU. Indeed, the Commission can use hard-law processes, 
such as the SGP, to put pressure on national authorities so to make them adopt the 
recommended reforms in the social and labour fields. Due to its power-based nature, the 
effectiveness of the mechanism depends on the vulnerability of the State to this threat. 
Those States at risk of being put under an excessive deficit procedure have few other 
options apart from complying with the supranational recommendations. 
The case of France and, more specifically, the adoption of the so-called Loi Khomri 
(or Loi Travail) offers a good example in this regard.97 After the eruption of the crisis, 
the French budgetary position was problematic, and in 2009 the Council formally 
                                                                                                                                               
Stronger Economic Policy Coordination on the European Social Dimension: Issues of Legitimacy’, in M. 
Adams, F. Fabbrini and P. Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budget Constraints 
(Hart Publishing, 2015), 359-377 
93 D. Chalmers, ‘The European Redistributive State and a European Law of Struggle’, (2012) 18 
European Law Journal 667, 679-681. Further on this point, D. Chalmers, ‘Crisis Reconfiguration of the 
European State’, in D. Chalmers, M. Jachtenfuchs and C. Joerges (eds.) The End of the Eurocrats Dream 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016), 266-298. 
94 At 3 
95 Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the National Reform Programme 2015 of Ireland and 
delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of Ireland, 2015, OJ C 272 of 18.08.2015, 45. 
96 Council Recommendation of 12 July 2016 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of Austria and 
delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of Austria, 2016, OJ C 299 of 18.08.2016, 60. 
97 R. Erne, ‘A Supranational Regime that Nationalizes Social Conflict: Explaining European Trade 
Unions’ Difficulties in Politicizing European Economic Governance’, (2015) 56 Labor History 345, 348.  
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opened an excessive deficit procedure against France.98 Little happened until 2013, 
when the Commission and the Council started to put greater emphasis on the link 
between the “correction of the fiscal imbalances” and “a credible implementation of 
ambitious structural reforms to increase the adjustment capacity and boost growth and 
employment”.99 In particular, France was recommended to reduce the cost of labour and 
to “ensure that developments in the minimum wage are supportive of competitiveness 
and job creation”.100 The same happened, with only minor terminological variations, in 
2014101 and 2015.102 All these recommendations were adopted on the basis of Article 6 
Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011. In February 2015, the French Government bowed to 
the pressure, passing a law that aimed at rendering the labour market more business-
friendly. The law was adopted by an executive order,103 so as to avoid that the 
Assemblée Nationale could reject it and thus send “the wrong signal to the European 
Commission, a week before deciding whether to fine France for missing its deficit 
targets”.104 The decision paid off as the Commission refrained from penalizing France, 
despite its failure to bring the deficit under the 3 percent threshold.105          
 
4.2 The subordination of social objectives to economic ones within the Semester 
The choice of bringing social and labour policy coordination under the shadow of 
SGP and MIP has a bearing also on the ideational component of the Semester and, in 
particular, on the relationship between economic and social objectives therein. This 
framework has been created to fill a gap within the EMU. Therefore, it comes as little 
surprise that it tends to focus on a narrow set of policy objectives, such as budgetary 
discipline and competitiveness, which are seen as contributing to the strengthening of 
the EMU, prioritising them over potentially conflicting goals, such as social ones.106 
More in detail, national social spaces have been mostly considered either as a cost to be 
reduced in order to balance the budget or as a factor that, if duly ‘modernized’, could 
contribute to boosting the competitiveness of the State. Barring few notable exceptions, 
                                                 
98 Council Decision No. 2009/414/EC of 27 April 2009 on the existence of an excessive deficit in 
France, OJ L 135 of 30.05.2009, 19-20. 
99 Council Recommendation of 9 July 2013 on the National Reform Programme 2013 of France and 
delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of France, 2012-2017, OJ C 217 of 30.07.2013, 
31. 
100 Ibidem. 
101 Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National Reform Programme 2014 of France and 
delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of France, 2014, OJ C 247 of 29.07.2014, 47-
48. 
102 Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of France and 
delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of France, OJ C 272 of 18.08.2015, 55. 
103 The Loi Travail has been published in the Journal officiel only on the 6th August 2016, after that 
several versions have been rejected either by the Assemblée Nationale or by the Senat. Many of the most 
controversial aspects of the original version of the Loi have been amended or scrapped altogether, so that, 
just a few days after his election, President Macron announced a new reform of the law. This push finds 
strong support at supranational level, as demonstrated by the recommendation issued in 2016 by the 
Council, which invited the French Government to “ensure that the labour cost reductions are sustained 
and that minimum wage developments are consistent with job creation and competitiveness” (Council 
Recommendation of 12 July 2016 on the 2016 National Reform Programme of Finland and delivering a 
Council opinion on the 2016 Stability Programme of Finland, OJ C 299 of 18.08.2016, 82). 
104 A-S. Chassany, ‘French Government Overrides Parliament to Ram though Reforms’, Financial 
Times, online edition, 17 February 2015 https://www.ft.com/content/3e2f4314-b67b-11e4-a5f2-
00144feab7de 
105 European Commission, Recommendation for a Council Recommendation with a view to bringing 
an end to the excessive government deficit in France, 27 February 2015, COM(2015) 115 def. 
106 S. Giubboni, ‘The Rise and Fall of EU Labour Law’, (2018) 24 European Law Journal 7, 9-10; 
Dawson, above, n. 89, at 196. 
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scant consideration has been paid to their capacity to pursue their typical objectives, 
such as advancing dignity, cohesion and social justice.107 The Semester has thus 
contributed to accentuating the process of colonization of national social spaces by 
economic policy’s logic and priorities.108   
Budgetary discipline has long represented the main objective of the coordination 
system. This is hardly surprising for a framework whose stated aim is to ensure the 
smooth functioning of the EMU. Indeed, budgetary discipline has been long recognized 
as a key component of the economic and monetary regime established by the Maastricht 
Treaty,109 and it has been enshrined in Protocol No. 12 attached to the Treaties. Some of 
the measures adopted in the aftermath of the crisis have further enhanced its status, as is 
the case of Article 3 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union110 that required the Contracting Parties to give effect to 
the balanced budget rule through binding provisions, “preferably constitutional”.111 The  
AGS 2011, the first ever adopted, made it clear that its “first priority” was “to set 
budgetary policies on a sound footing through rigorous fiscal consolidation”.112 A 
similar reference, albeit couched in more circuitous terms, can be found in the AGS 
2016, which stressed the “need to continue to support growth- and equity-friendly fiscal 
consolidation in many countries”, by making sure that “social protection systems [are] 
modernised to efficiently respond to risks throughout the lifecycle while remaining 
fiscally sustainable in view of the upcoming demographic challenges”.113 Interestingly 
enough, the prioritization of fiscal discipline over any other objective is conceived, as 
explained in the AGS 2012, as “a basis […] to securing the future of the European 
social model”.114   
CSRs, especially those of the early cycles of the Semester, are fully in line with this 
approach. They treat the reduction of social expenditure as the main route towards fiscal 
probity. Pensions have traditionally attracted much attention in this context, due to their 
importance for national budgets. Therefore, over the years several States have been 
recommended to reform their pension regimes with the primary aim of ensuring their 
long-term sustainability: this has been the case of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Finland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain, among others. The content of these recommendations is 
strikingly similar, pushing the State concerned to “contain future public expenditure 
growth relating to ageing, in particular from pensions and long-term care, by stepping 
up efforts to reduce the gap between the effective and statutory retirement age, bringing 
forward the reduction of early-exit possibilities, promoting active ageing, aligning the 
                                                 
107 From this perspective, the Semester has represented a step back if compared with previous EU 
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retirement age to changes in life expectancy”.115 Health care, another very costly 
component of national social spaces, has also been subject to close attention in this 
context. For instance, in 2014, Luxembourg was recommended, “in view of ensuring 
fiscal sustainability, [to] curb age‐related expenditure by making long‐term care more 
cost‐effective”,116 while Ireland was asked to “advance the reform of the healthcare 
sector initiated under the Future Health strategic framework to increase cost-
effectiveness. Pursue additional measures to reduce pharmaceutical spending, including 
through more frequent price realignment exercise for patented medicines, increased 
generic penetration and improved prescribing practices”.117 Similarly, in 2017 the 
Council recommended Portugal to “strengthen expenditure control, cost effectiveness 
and adequate budgeting, in particular in the health sector with a focus on the reduction 
of arrears in hospitals and ensure the sustainability of the pension system”.118  
As the fiscal position of Member States gradually improved, another objective rose 
to prominence in the context of the European Semester, even outweighing budgetary 
discipline. The promotion of growth by enhancing Member States’ competitiveness and 
capacity to attract private investments progressively become the main aim of the 
coordination framework, especially after the Commission itself recognized that “[f]iscal 
consolidation and financial repair are not sufficient in themselves”.119  
As observed with regard to budgetary discipline, also this set of recommendations 
tends to make the functioning of social protection systems and the regulation of the 
labour market subject to the achievement of overarching economic objectives, such as 
economic growth, competitiveness and job creation. As made clear in the AGS 2017, 
social policy is primarily, if not exclusively, a “productive factor”,120 which must be 
“redesigned” in order to enhance efficiency, cost containment and private participation. 
Once again, little attention is given to principles, such as solidarity, equity, inclusion 
and cohesion, which are the bedrock of the traditional paradigm of the welfare state.  
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The reform of the labour market and, in particular, of wage-setting mechanisms 
aimed at removing those elements perceived as ‘rigidities’ are ever-present ingredients 
of these recipes. For instance, the AGS 2012, after a reference to the need to implement 
“balanced flexisecurity policies”, urged Member States to move forward in “revising 
wage setting mechanisms […] to better reflect productivity developments”.121 The AGS 
2013 went even further by praising the “ambitious reforms” that had been implemented 
across Europe in order to “facilitate flexible working arrangements within firms, reduce 
severance pay for standard contracts and simplify individual or collective dismissal 
procedures”.122 The AGS 2017 exhorted Member States to “make sure that their wage-
setting systems are effective in delivering both job creation and real income increases, 
and for that adjust better to changes in productivity over time”.123 
CSRs follow the very same track, as well demonstrated by the case of France 
described above or by Finland, which, in 2016, was recommended, “[to] ensure that the 
wage setting system enhances local wage bargaining and removes rigidities, 
contributing to competitiveness and a more export industry-led approach”.124  
 
5.3 The socialization of the European Semester and the EMU Social Dimension: 
Any real change of paradigm? 
Over the years, EU institutions have acknowledged the need to reconfigure the 
relationship between economic and social objectives within the new European economic 
governance. The same approach underpins other initiatives aimed at reinforcing the 
social dimension of the EMU. In 2013, the Commission adopted a Communication on 
“Strengthening the Social Dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union”.125 The 
document, which represents the follow-up to the blueprint for a deep and genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union,126 duly recognized that rebalancing the social and 
economic dimensions is not just desirable from an economic and political perspective; it 
is also a legal duty under Article 9 TFEU. However, what follows does not fulfil the 
expectations generated by these potentially far-reaching premises. Indeed, according to 
this document, “the ‘social dimension of the EMU relates to the ability of economic 
governance mechanisms and policy instruments to identify, take into account and 
address problematic developments and challenges related to employment and social 
policies in the EMU”.127 The definition makes no reference to the possibility that 
safeguarding the values and interests that underpin the social dimension may limit, or 
even trump, the pursuit of EMU objectives, as was the case when the very same notion 
was introduced in the context of the internal market. Deprived of its rebalancing 
function, this dimension is still considered just as a constitutive element of EMU, to be 
safeguarded as long as it can contribute to the achievement of its core objectives by 
addressing issues − such as unemployment and social problems − that “hold back 
competitiveness and the growth potential of the economies concerned”.128 This 
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document, as well as others adopted later, consolidates the idea that, from a 
supranational perspective, national social spaces’ functions and aims are merely a 
component of the EMU apparatus. As explained in a strategic note adopted by the 
Commission in 2015, “the performance of the euro area depends in no small measure on 
the effectiveness of its members’ social systems. Indeed, social imbalances pose a 
political and economic threat to the sustainability of the euro area, similar in magnitude 
– even if different in character – to economic and financial risks”.129  
Operationally, the strengthening of the EMU social dimension was pursued mainly 
through the ‘socialization’ of the European Semester.130 This process touched upon both 
its organizational and its substantive components.  
As for the first aspect, since 2013 there has been an attempt to make the drafting of 
the CSRs more collaborative, involving Commission Directorates General other than 
just ECFIN. This should have contributed to opening up the whole process to social 
issues and concerns. Moreover, the Commission tried to enhance the participation of 
national and EU social partners in various supranational phases of the coordination 
process, establishing new venues for involvement and providing better access to 
decision-making fora. These changes, albeit certainly welcome and potentially 
interesting, have had a limited impact on the way in which the Semester works, at least 
so far. For instance, looking at the involvement of social partners, a recently published 
paper warns against the risk that all these reforms may well end up by increasing social 
partners’ opportunities to be listened to, while leaving substantially unchanged their 
capacity to be heard.131  
Turning to the substantive dimension, the Commission sought to reinforce and 
deepen social and employment surveillance and coordination within the Semester. This 
mainly materialized in the introduction of new scoreboards and indicators to monitor 
employment and social developments, confirming the Commission’s highly 
technocratic approach toward social policy and its continuous faith in numbers as 
governing tools. For instance, in 2014 the Commission included a number of auxiliary 
employment and social indicators within the group informing the Alert Mechanism 
Report of the MIP to complement the only social indicator already existing in that 
context, which focused on unemployment.132 This evolution is set to be bolstered by the 
adoption of the European Pillar of Social Rights, a document setting out 20 key 
principles and rights regarding equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair 
working conditions and social protection and inclusion that has been proclaimed with 
much fanfare in November 2017.133 According to the AGS 2018, the Pillar should 
“serve as a point of reference for the further implementation of the European Semester”, 
being “a compass for renewed convergence towards better working and living 
conditions”.134 Concretely, the document is set to inspire a further set of indicators 
aiming at “monitor[ing] ‘societal progress’” and detecting “the most significant 
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employment and social challenges facing the Member States, the EU and the euro area, 
as well as progress achieved over time”.135 
The introduction of new social indicators in different surveillance and coordination 
processes has certainly contributed to imbue programmatic documents and CSRs with 
greater social sensitivity, as demonstrated by the growing number of recommendations 
that treat social issues not just as factors that should contribute to the attainment of 
EMU core objectives. For instance, in 2017 the Council recommended Belgium to 
“ensure that the most disadvantaged groups, including people with migrant background, 
have equal access to quality education, vocational training, and the labour market”,136 
Spain to “address regional disparities and fragmentation in income guarantee schemes 
and improve family support, including access to quality childcare”137 and Ireland to 
“enhance social infrastructure, including social housing and quality childcare”.138 
It is doubtful whether this evolution actually marks the end of the prioritisation of 
economic objectives over social ones within the Semester. Indeed, the more ‘socially-
oriented’ recommendations are still marginal if compared with those that perpetuate the 
‘traditional’ approach. Furthermore, these recommendations perpetuate a vision of 
social policy that is at odd with the universalistic model that was at the basis of the 
evolution of the welfare state in the post-war period and that, as seen above, constitutes 
a key component of Member States’ constitutional identity. The recommended reforms 
place much emphasis on the principles of formal equality, individual responsibility and 
reduced welfare dependency.139 In this context, individuals have to rely first on the 
market to satisfy their needs, while social safety nets should be targeted and highly 
selective in their functioning.    
 
5. National social spaces, financial assistance and conditionality  
 
5.1 Intruding into national social spaces by escaping from the EU Treaties (and the 
rule of law) 
Conditionality is a key feature of all the financial assistance packages and 
mechanisms that have been adopted to salvage EU Member States in difficulty because 
of the economic crisis.140 This was the case already with earlier balance-of-payments 
assistance programmes141 used to rescue non-Euro States, such as Hungary,142 Latvia143 
                                                 
135 Commission Staff Working Document, Social Scoreboard, Brussels, 26.04.2017, SWD(2017) 200 
final, 2.  
136 Council Recommendation of 11 July 2017 on the 2017 National Reform Programme of Belgium 
and delivering a Council opinion on the 2017 Stability Programme of Belgium, OJ C 261 of 09.08.2017, 
6. 
137 Council Recommendation of 11 July 2017 on the 2017 National Reform Programme of Spain and 
delivering a Council opinion on the 2017 Stability Programme of Spain, OJ C 261 of 09.08.2017, 35. 
138 Council Recommendation of 11 July 2017 on the 2017 National Reform Programme of Ireland 
and delivering a Council opinion on the 2017 Stability Programme of Ireland, OJ C 261 of 09.08.2017, 
30. 
139 J. Vignon and B. Cantillon, ‘Is There a Time for “Social Europe”? Looking Beyond the Lisbon 
Strategy Paradigm’, OSE Opinion Paper No. 9/2012, 5 
140 See, ex multis, A. Baraggia, ‘Conditionality Measures within the Euro Area Crisis: A Challenge to 
the Democratic Principle?’, (2015) 4 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 268; M. 
Ioannidis M., ‘EU Financial Assistance Conditionality after “Two Pack”, (2014) 74 ZaörV 61. 
141 Conditionality was far more lenient and less intrusive in balance-of-payments assistance packages 
in the 1970s and 1980s: see H.W. Stieber, European Macro-Financial Solidarity Mechanisms 1971-1993: 
Balance of Payments Assistance between the End of Bretton Woods and the Launch of EMU (2015) 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2544996.  
142 Council Decision 2009/102/EC of 4 November 2008 providing Community medium-term financial 
assistance for Hungary, OJ L 37 of 06.02.2009, 5-6. 
 21 
and Romania,144 as well as with regard to the financial package hastily arranged to save 
Greece in 2010. In the latter case, in May 2010 the Eurogroup stated that stability 
support could be granted only “on the basis of a programme which has been negotiated 
with the Greek authorities by the Commission and the IMF, in liaison with the 
[European Central Bank]”.145 The same goes for the financial mechanisms created after 
the eruption of the crisis, such as the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism 
(EFSM),146 the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF),147 established in 2010 as a 
temporary mechanism to provide financial help to Euro area Member States, and the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM).148 In particular, Article 12 of the ESM Treaty 
posits that “the ESM may provide stability support to an ESM Member subject to strict 
conditionality”. Lastly, conditionality was set to play a pivotal role also in the context of 
the Outright Monetary Transactions announced, but never implemented, by the 
European Central Bank (‘ECB’) in 2012. In this context, sovereign bonds purchases had 
to be subject to respect by the beneficiary State of the policy conditions enshrined in an 
EFSF or ESM programme.149 More recently, it has been established that sovereign 
bonds purchases under the Public Sector Purchase Programme depend on a positive 
outcome of the programme review.150 
The decision to make financial assistance conditional on respect by the beneficiary 
State of a macro-adjustment programme owes much to the influence exercised by the 
International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) in shaping the EU response to the sovereign debt 
crisis.151 However, conditionality was not just an external imposition: the need to make 
financial assistance subject to the respect of strict policy requirements was quickly 
internalized, receiving strong support from some EU Member States and EU institutions 
alike. This led to the granting of constitutional status to conditionality: in 2011 a new 
paragraph was added to Article 136 TFEU so as to allow establishment of the European 
Stability Mechanism, which mandates making “the granting of any required financial 
assistance under the mechanism […] subject to strict conditionality”.152 
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Conditionality represents a quantum leap in the transformative process described in 
previous sections. It gives EU institutions an unprecedented capacity to intrude into 
national social spaces and, hence, to subordinate the exercise of social functions to the 
pursuit of economic objectives. This transformation represents an “extreme case of 
vertical […] integration in the policy arena, which goes well beyond what is generally 
meant by Europeanization, and cannot be captured through multilevel governance 
heuristic”.153  
Operationally, the transformation is premised upon the escape154 from EU Treaties 
and, as denounced by many commentators, the “degradation of basic legal values” 
underpinning the EU legal architecture.155 Indeed, this allows supranational institutions 
to engage in close surveillance and micromanagement of social and labour policies to an 
extent that goes well beyond the limits set by the principle of conferral and the other 
Treaty provisions safeguarding the European social dimension.156 Acting outside the EU 
legal order, creditors and their representatives can fully exploit the asymmetry of power 
that underpins the relationship between a party that controls the financial resources and 
another that badly needs those resources to avoid default.    
The escape from EU law, its logic and guarantees is all the more evident in those 
cases where EU institutions and, in particular, the ECB resorted to informal tools, such 
as secret letters, to put pressure on some Member States in order to force them into 
socially painful structural adjustment programmes. This approach, bordering on 
blackmail, has been adopted in the case of Italy, which, in August 2011, received a 
letter157 from the then President of the ECB and the then Governor of the Italian Central 
Bank detailing a list of measures that it had to take and even the legal instruments that it 
had to use. The adoption of these reforms was considered a condition to benefit from the 
purchase of sovereign debt paper on the secondary market in the context of the 
Securities Market Programme, although the letter did not make this link explicit. The 
same line of action has also been followed with Spain and, although using other forms 
of pressure, with Ireland,158 Cyprus159 and Greece.160 
                                                                                                                                               
currency is the euro, OJ L 91 of 06.04.2011, 1-2. See De Witte B. (2011), The European Treaty 
Amendment for the Creation of a Financial Stability Mechanism, SIEPS, 1-6. 
153 S. Sacchi, ‘Conditionality by Other means: EU Involvement in Italy’s Structural Reforms in the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis’, (2015) 13 Comparative European Politics 77. 
154 Baraggia, above, n. 140, at 274 
155 Menéndez, above, n. 8, at 74-78; C. Kilpatrick, ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: 
The Degradation of Basic Legal Values in Europe’s Bailouts’, (2015) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1; 
F. Munari, ‘Crisi dell’Euro e crisi delle regole: Rule of Law o ragion politica? Il diritto dell’Unione 
europea dinanzi a nuove sfide’, in O. Porchia (ed.), Governance economica europea. Strumenti 
dell’Unione, rapporti con l’ordinamento internazionale e ricadute sull’ordinamento interno 
(Giappichelli, 2015), 33-56. 
156 Ioannidis, above, n. 140, at 63; A. Koukiadaki, ‘The Legacy of Economic Crisis for Labour Law in 
Europe’, in Bogg, Costello, Davies, above, n. 44, at 83-84. 
157 See http://www.corriere.it/economia/11_settembre_29/trichet_draghi_inglese_304a5f1e-ea59-
11e0-ae06-4da866778017.shtml?refresh_ce-cp. See Sacchi, above, n. 153, at 81-88. 
158 In this case, the ECB played a key role in forcing the State to enter a structural adjustment 
programme to be negotiated with the Troika. In a letter of 15 October 2010, Trichet reminded the then 
Irish Minister of Finance of the ECB Governing Council’s powers and discretionality in applying 
collateral rules and in setting limits to ELA, In a subsequent letter of 19 November 2010, Trichet was 
even clearer on this point. He stated that “[i]t is the position of the Governing Council that it is only if we 
receive in writing a commitment from the Irish Government vis-à-vis the Eurosystem on the four 
following points that we can authorize further provision of ELA to Irish financial institutions: 1) The Irish 
government shall send a request for financial support to the Eurogroup; 2) The request shall include the 
commitment to undertake decisive actions in the areas of fiscal consolidation structural reforms and 
financial sector restructuring, in agreement with the European Commission, the IMF and the ECB […]”. 
 23 
Unfortunately, the same trait also characterises explicit conditionality. Indeed, the 
rules governing the definition, approval and monitoring of the conditions attached to 
financial assistance packages have a “mixed legal parentage”161 that combines 
international agreements, EU legal acts and other documents, such as Memoranda of 
Understanding (‘MoU’), whose legal nature is contested and that some consider as not 
even creating legally binding commitments.162 Traditionally, the dominant view has 
been that these provisions fall outside the EU legal framework.  
This view has been endorsed also by the Court, which has constantly rejected all the 
claims brought by private applicants seeking the annulment of acts addressed to a 
Member State in the context of a financial assistance programme. A recent and fitting 
example is the Ledra case,163 concerning the ESM intervention to assist Cyprus. ESM 
financial assistance, which lasted from 2013 to 2016, was granted on the back of a 
macro-economic adjustment programme set by a MoU negotiated between the Troika 
and the Cypriot authorities. Negotiations started in 2012 and ended in April 2013, when 
the MoU was signed by the Commission on behalf of the ESM, the Central Bank of 
Cyprus and the Minister of Finance of Cyprus. In the meanwhile, the Cypriot authorities 
put the two largest Cypriot banks into resolution and provided for the recapitalisation of 
one of them, at the expense of uninsured depositors, shareholders and bondholders. 
Some of them, after having seen a substantial decrease in the value of their deposits, 
turned to the EU General Court, seeking annulment of the parts of the MoU providing 
for the restructuring of the banks. The General Court164 swiftly rejected the claim, 
pointing to the fact that the MoU had been adopted by the Republic of Cyprus and the 
ESM and, thus, because it was not an act of an EU institution, body, office or agency, its 
legality could not be reviewed under Article 263 TFEU. 
The disconnection between bailout measures and the EU legal framework lies at the 
basis of the decisions of the Court rejecting the requests for preliminary rulings 
submitted by national courts and, in that context, excluding the applicability of the EU 
Charter on Fundamental Rights (‘the Charter’) to austerity measures.165 This is what 
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happened, for instance, in Sindicato dos Bancarios do Norte,166 a case concerning the 
Portuguese bailout package.167 Here the Court found that the cuts to public sector wages 
and the suspension the payment of bonuses had not been adopted by the Portuguese 
authorities to implement EU law and thus fell outside the scope of application of the 
Charter according to Article 51 thereof. The approach has been rightly criticized for 
being unduly restrictive if compared with the Court’s previous case-law and for 
disregarding the strong linkages existing between bailout programmes and EU law.168 
The Court’s position seems all the more untenable169 after the entry into force of 
Regulation no. 472/2013, which requires Eurozone States requesting, or already “in 
receipt”170 of, financial assistance to “prepare, in agreement with the Commission, 
acting in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, with the IMF, a draft 
macroeconomic adjustment programme”171 to be approved by the Council on a proposal 
by the Commission.  
 
5.2 National social spaces as adjustment variables in structural adjustment 
programmes  
Many of the conditions attached to financial assistance programmes touch upon key 
aspects of national social spaces, pointing to the reduction of social expenditure, the 
modernisation of social protection systems or the reform of labour market regulation in 
a way that is fully coherent with the approach followed by CSRs in the context of the 
European Semester. This does not occur by mere coincidence, since both the ESM 
Treaty172 and Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013 explicitly require structural adjustment 
programmes to be compatible with economic policy coordination measures and even 
aiming at “broadening, strengthening and deepening the required policy measures.173 As 
explained by the Court in Pringle, “the purpose of the strict conditionality […] is to 
ensure that the ESM and the recipient Member States comply with measures adopted by 
the Union in particular in the area of the coordination of Member States’ economic 
policies, those measures being designed, inter alia, to ensure that the Member States 
pursue a sound budgetary policy”.174  
However, conditionality also serves deterrent purposes, which are largely absent in 
economic coordination efforts. As pointedly observed by Schepel, “States will have to 
be deterred from pursuing unsound budgetary policies by the prospect of having to live 
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through the same amount of pain and misery inflicted on States assisted by the ESM”.175 
Conditionality therefore aims to correct the distortion of Member States’ incentives, 
reducing the risk of moral hazard by preventing some of them from persevering in 
unsound fiscal behaviours in the belief that others will pay the costs.176 From that 
perspective, conditionality fits perfectly with the tale “that attributes the euro zone 
malaise to lazy southern grasshoppers begging for money from the productive, 
disciplined and ant-like northerners”.177 This imagery, which has been eagerly embraced 
by creditor countries’ politicians to please their disgruntled electoral bases, provides an 
apparently sound justification for cutting back on Southern States’ excessively generous 
welfare systems and for asking them to do their homework in order to restore their 
competitiveness. But this is to forget that their problems are mainly due to structural 
imbalances that, as seen above, are inherent in the EMU as it stands.  
Similarly to what was observed with regard to the Semester, socially relevant 
conditions can be divided into two categories on the basis of their main objective. A 
first set of conditions aims at contributing to the reduction of sovereign debt through 
cuts to social outlays. The second group of conditions centres on restoring beneficiary 
States’ external competitiveness, mainly by fostering internal devaluation. 
Targeting social spending as the main path to the reduction of public debt has been a 
feature of all rescue packages from the outset. In the case of Greece, for instance, the 
first Economic Adjustment Programme of 2010 envisaged cuts in health care 
expenditure amounting to more than 2 billion euros by 2015 and cuts in social benefits 
amounting to more than 5 billion euros by the same year.178 The Memorandum of 
Economic and Financial Policies of the second Economic Adjustment Programme 
(2012) plainly admitted that most of the cuts imposed by the “bold structural spending 
reforms” “will need to fall on social transfers”.179 The same approach prevailed also in 
the documents detailing the conditions attached to the Third Economic Adjustment 
Programme, approved in August 2015. In this context, Greek authorities committed to 
fully implementing pensions reforms in order to target savings of around 0.25 percent of 
GDP in 2015 and 1 percent of GDP in 2016.  
The second group of socially relevant conditions aims at restoring beneficiary 
States’ external competitiveness through the adoption of structural reforms that can 
make welfare institutions and, above all, labour markets work in a more growth-friendly 
way. The objective has been mostly pursued by reducing wages and other labour costs, 
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making individual and collective dismissals easier, forcing Member States to revise (or 
even dismantle) their wage-setting arrangements by, inter alia, giving precedence to 
individual over collective bargaining. All of this should foster internal devaluation, 
which, in a monetary union where currency devaluation is no longer an option and 
where there is not centralised fiscal capacity, has seemingly become the only adjustment 
variable to respond to structural imbalances.180 
This approach informed all the Greek assistance packages. For instance, the MoU of 
March 2010 established that “[i]n dialogue with social partners, the government 
proposes and parliament adopts legislation to reform wage bargaining system in the 
private sector, which should provide for a reduction in pay rates for overtime work and 
enhanced flexibility in the management of working time. Allow local territorial pacts to 
set wage growth below sectoral agreements and introduce variable pay to link wages to 
productivity performance at the firm level”.181 The Second Adjustment Programme was 
even more penetrating on this point, since “the outcome of the social dialogue to 
promote employment and competitiveness fell short of expectations”. Therefore, the 
Greek Government undertook to adopt, prior to the disbursement of the financial 
support, a series of measures, such as a 22 percent reduction of minimum wage, the 
introduction of sub-minimum wages for young people – ten percent less than the normal 
one – and the reform of wage-setting mechanisms, leading to an “overhaul of the 
national general collective agreement”.182 The Third Adjustment Programme, approved 
in 2015, envisaged the launch of a consultation process touching upon several key 
aspects of the labour market. The process should lead to the reform of the rules 
governing collective dismissal, industrial action and collective bargaining, so as to bring 
them “in line with the best practice in the EU”.183 For greater certainty, the document 
added that, in any case, “[c]hanges to labour market policies should not involve a return 
to past policy settings which are not compatible with the goals of promoting sustainable 
and inclusive growth”.184  
Similarly, Portuguese authorities agreed to reform employment protection 
legislation, mainly by cutting severance payments and broadening the cases of permitted 
individual dismissals, as well as “promote wage developments consistent with the 
objectives of fostering job creation and improving firms’ competitiveness with a view to 
correcting macroeconomic imbalances”.185 Furthermore, seeking to align wage 
developments with productivity, the Portuguese Government committed to decentralize 
the bargaining process by strengthening the role of firm-level agreements vis-à-vis 
sectoral collective ones.  
 
5.3. Attempts at socializing structural adjustment programmes: little improvement, 
so far  
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The harsh – but largely well-deserved – criticisms levelled against the one-sided 
approach that has characterized conditionality in the context of financial assistance 
programmes have not fallen on totally deaf ears in Brussels. Over the years, there have 
been some attempts to imbue structural adjustment programmes with greater social 
sensitivity. At present, these developments seem largely inadequate, failing, inter alia, 
to bring to an end the subordination of national social spaces’ reforms to the logics and 
aims of the EMU.   
A first example to be considered is the regulation establishing a single conditionality 
procedure applicable to all financial assistance mechanisms. In particular, Article 7 of 
Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013 establishes that, when a Member State requests financial 
assistance, the draft macroeconomic adjustment programme has to take “into account 
the practice and institutions for wage formation and the national reform programme of 
the Member State concerned”, as well as to “fully observe Article 152 TFEU and 
Article 28 of the Charter”. Moreover, President Juncker’s apparently sought to lend its 
political support to this evolution by making it one of the key aspects of its manifesto. 
The Political Guidelines for the new Commission established that “in the future, any 
support and reform programme [should go] not only through a fiscal sustainability 
assessment; but through a social impact assessment as well”, so as to ensure that “the 
social effects of structural reforms [are] discussed in public”.186  
So far all these attempts have led to only marginal variations on the main theme, 
leaving substantially untouched the unequal relationship between social objectives and 
economic ones in this context. An example in this regard is the adoption, prior to the 
Greek Adjustment Programme of 2015, of the Assessment of the Social Impact of the 
new Stability Support Programme for Greece, a document purporting “to show how the 
design of the stability support programme has taken social factors into account”.187 
Despite its title, the document fails to properly engage with the Greek social disaster, as 
well as to explore its root causes and its relationship with the Troika’s recipes. Instead, 
it simply praises the reforms that Greek governments have adopted over the last few 
years in fields like pensions, tax policy, labour market, job creation and product 
markets, urging the need to move further ahead along this path. Indeed, as the very last 
sentence of the document makes clear, “if implemented fully and timely, the measures 
envisaged under the new ESM stability support programme will bring Greece back to 
stability and growth, in a financially and socially sustainable way. In so doing, the 
burden of adjustment is distributed as equitably and as fairly as possible across society, 
and adequately takes account of the most pressing social needs and challenges in 
Greece”.188    
Therefore, it is hardly a surprise to discover that the content of recent MoUs is very 
much in line with their predecessors. The much-heralded move toward a more socially-
conscious conditionality is confined to a few marginal elements having little bearing on 
its core content and structure. For instance, on the one hand, the August 2015 
Memorandum for Greece explicitly recognized the need for greater social justice, urging 
the Greek Government to “roll out a basic social safety net in the form of a Guaranteed 
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Minimum Income”189 and praised the adoption of some measures aimed at supporting 
the most vulnerable part of the population.190 On the other hand, the document still 
closely adhered to the idea that the reform of national social spaces should, first of all, 
pursue economic and fiscal objectives, such as “controlling public expenditure”.191 
Likewise, the 2016 Supplemental MoU for Greece put much emphasis on the need to 
reform the social safety nets,192 but it then made clear that the main objective to be 
achieved through this comprehensive reform was to “generate savings of 0.5% 
annually”.193 Furthermore, the document contained a prescription urging Greek 
authorities to “compensate for the cost of the Council of State ruling (equivalent to 2 
percent of GDP) on some aspects of the previous pension reforms”.194 This condition 
refers to a 2015 decision by the Greek Supreme Court finding that the 2012 pension cuts 
breached the Greek Constitution and the European Convention of Human Rights 
(‘ECHR’) for depriving pensioners of their right to a decent life. This is a very troubling 
example of the depth of the transformation of the European constitutional constellation: 
far from representing a cornerstone of the so-called European social model, the 
protection of social rights is now seen as a cost that needs to be compensated. 
A second evolution worth considering is the Court’s renewed commitment to the 
protection of fundamental rights in the context of structural adjustment programmes. As 
seen above, the Court went through a long period in which it seemed to adhere fully to 
the idea that bailout measures were immune from judicial scrutiny at supranational 
level.195 However, there are now some tentative signs of developments in the opposite 
direction. An example in this regard is the Florescu judgment of June 2017. The case 
concerned a Romanian law of 2009 that prohibited combining a pension with an income 
for activities carried out in a public institution. Anyone in such position had to either ask 
for the suspension of the pension or relinquish the paid job. The law had been adopted 
in order to fulfil the obligations arising under the MoU negotiated by the Romanian 
Government with the Commission as a condition to obtain financial assistance from the 
EU. Three retired judges, teaching at the law faculty of Sibiu, challenged the measure, 
which, in their view, violated several of their rights. The Court of Appeal decided to 
stay proceedings and raise a number of preliminary questions. In 2011 and 2012 the 
Court dismissed two requests concerning similar measures adopted by Romanian 
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authorities on the basis of the very same law, finding “an easy escape route”196 in poorly 
drafted orders for reference that failed to highlight the connection between national 
measures and EU law. Conversely, in Florescu the Court declared its competence to 
rule on the compatibility between Romanian austerity measures and EU law provisions 
protecting fundamental rights. To this end, it found that the MoU is reviewable under 
Article 267 TFEU, since it is mandatory and “constitutes an act of an EU institution”.197 
This was the first time, nine years after the first financial assistance programme was 
launched, in which the Court took a clear position on this issue. Yet, the implications of 
this finding need to be assessed against the specificities of Romania’s assistance 
programme. Indeed, the latter was based on Article 143 TFEU, which empowers the EU 
to financially assist non-euro States facing difficulties as regards their balance of 
payments. This means that the MoU at issue stems from EU law, having being adopted 
on the basis of Article 143 TFEU and Regulation (EC) No. 332/2002.198 As a 
consequence, the Court had no difficulty in finding that the Charter was applicable to 
the case at hand. It pointed to the fact that Romanian authorities were implementing EU 
law when adopting measures that aimed at realizing the objectives set forth in the MoU. 
In the process, the Court excluded, by correctly referring to its previous case-law, that 
the existence of a margin of discretion for national authorities in deciding what 
measures were to be adopted could in any way call this analysis into question.199   
What remains to be seen is whether Florescu is a sign of a broader change of 
attitude by the Court or whether the latter will stick to its strict interpretative approach 
when deciding on the applicability of the Charter in cases where bailout conditions are 
set by documents whose main legal basis lies outside the EU legal framework. This 
could have the effect of even further distancing the possibility of bringing structural 
adjustment programmes fully under EU law, as recently proposed by the 
Commission.200 The Court has been recently given the chance to shed more light on this 
issue, but it purposely eluded it. The case concerned the reduction of the salaries of 
Portuguese Court of Auditors’ judges resulting from a law adopted in 2014 that scaled 
down the remuneration of many categories of public servants, thereby fulfilling one of 
the conditions contained in the structural adjustment programme negotiated with the 
Troika. In the national proceeding, the claimants sought to have the measure annulled, 
arguing that it contrasted with the principle of judicial independence as enshrined in 
Article 19 TEU and in Article 47 of the Charter. The referring judge – the Supremo 
Tribunal Administrativo – asked the Court whether these EU provisions must be 
interpreted in the sense of precluding the adoption of measures such as the contested 
ones. In his Opinion, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe201 concluded that the Portuguese measure 
“constitutes an implementation of provisions of EU law, within the meaning of Article 
51 of the Charter”.202 The conclusion seemingly pointed to the existence of a 
sufficiently strong linkage between the contested measures and the EU legal order. In 
particular, the AG posited, without spelling it out clearly, that the reduction of salaries 
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constituted a measure adopted to comply with conditions referred to also in EU legal 
acts, such as Council implementing decisions. Unfortunately, the Court felt no need to 
engage with this issue, focusing exclusively on Article 19 TEU, which has a broader 
scope of application than the Charter. This provision requires Member States to ensure 
effective legal protection “in the fields covered by Union law” and not just when they 
are implementing EU law.203  
The Court had already opened up another judicial avenue for the protection of 
fundamental rights in non-EU based structural adjustment programmes. In particular, it 
found that individuals can bring a non-contractual liability action against the EU when 
its institutions, even if acting outside the EU legal framework, violate fundamental 
rights. The question of whether EU institutions are bound to comply with EU law when 
acting outside the EU order had been left unanswered in Pringle. There the Court 
focused exclusively on the position of Member States, reiterating that they are not 
bound by the Charter “when they establish a stability mechanism such as the ESM”, 
since they are not implementing Union law.204 Conversely, in the above-mentioned 
Ledra judgment the Court tried to fill this gap by declaring the admissibility of an action 
for damages brought by a number of Cypriot investors against the EU, pointing to the 
role played by the Commission in the negotiation and conclusion of the MoU.205 In 
particular, starting from the premise that participation in the ESM activities cannot alter 
the powers conferred to the institution by the Treaties, the Court established that “the 
Commission retains, […] within the framework of the ESM Treaty, its role of guardian 
of the Treaties as resulting from article 17(1) TEU”. For this reason, it is bound to 
“refrain from signing a memorandum of understanding” when “it doubts” its 
consistency with EU law.206 To be sure, the judgment represents a welcome novelty, at 
least from the perspective of aggrieved individuals, because it is the first case where the 
Court has finally admitted the possibility that bailout measures are amenable to some 
form of judicial review in the EU legal order. However, the action for damages is a 
narrow avenue for the judicial protection of fundamental rights and it is doubtful 
whether it can properly safeguard national social spaces’ objectives and functions in the 
context of structural adjustment programmes. Indeed, not any violation of a EU norm 
can be challenged through this type of action.207 According to a well-established case 
law, EU non-contractual liability arises only when there is an actual damage caused by a 
sufficiently serious breach of a rule of Union law that confers rights on individuals.208 
Therefore, violations of other relevant rules – such as, for instance, the principle of 
conferral or the social clause – are hardly amenable to judicial scrutiny under this 
action. 
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Furthermore, in all these early cases the Court has adopted a rather deferential 
standard of review to assess the compatibility of national structural adjustment measures 
with the Charter’s provisions. The judges seem to have wholeheartedly followed the 
line of action proposed by Barnard, who argued that, instead of putting these measures 
outside the reach of EU law, the Court should address the merit of the cases, granting a 
wide margin of discretion to decision-makers in order to preserve their autonomy of 
action.209  
In Florescu, for instance, the Court found that the contested measure did not violate 
claimants’ right to property as enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter, since it “is capable 
of attaining the general interest objective pursued and is necessary to attain that 
objective”. While this conclusion is convincing in light of the caution of the measure 
and the content of the claim, what is less reassuring, especially in a forward looking 
perspective, is the way in which the Court reached it. Indeed, the whole reasoning 
hinges upon the wide margin of discretion that national authorities have “when adopting 
economic decisions”, since they are those “in the best position to determine the 
measures likely to achieve the objective pursued”.210 Such a highly deferential approach 
is at the vanishing point of judicial scrutiny, putting the Court in the spectator’s seat 
while national authorities are free to run the show as they wish. What justifies the 
granting of a wide margin is “the particular economic context”, which needs to be 
confronted by “reducing public sector wage costs and […] reforming the pension 
system”.211 The Court thus seems to share the sense of inevitability that pervades the 
adoption of austerity measures and is a defining feature of the technocratic approach 
prevailing in that context. This makes the pursuit of the objectives set in the MoU a 
‘trump card’ that can prevail over any other competing aim.  
         
6. Conclusion 
The risk that national social spaces could be a victim of the EMU was clear even 
before its creation. With the eruption of the Eurozone crisis and the ensuing reform of 
economic governance mechanisms this risk fully materialized. These reforms purported 
to enhance the capacity of supranational institutions to intrude into national social 
spaces, enabling them to exercise policy formulation, supervision and guidance on 
issues, such as pensions or wage levels, that fall squarely within Member States’ 
exclusive competence. This occurred neither through a reform of Treaty’s rules on the 
allocation of competences, nor by nominally violating them. In the case of the European 
Semester, the strengthening of supranational institutions’ capacity of intervention 
derived from the creation of a hybrid framework allowing the Commission to gain 
leverage in sectors covered by soft coordination processes while relying on the threat of 
hard sanctions. As regards bailout programmes, the transformation came about through 
recourse to non-EU law instruments so as to circumvent the limits set by the Treaties 
and the Charter.         
The reduction of Member States’ autonomy in the social sphere is functional to the 
stabilization of the EMU. Therefore, national social spaces have been treated either as a 
cost to be reduced in order to balance Member States’ budgets or as a factor that should 
contribute to increasing their external competitiveness. This happened in the European 
Semester and, in particular, in its early cycles, when most of the CSRs addressing social 
issues aimed at fiscal consolidation, labour market deregulation or wage reduction. 
Conditionality policy in the context of financial assistance programmes was a quantum 
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leap forward in this regard by stringently subordinating national social spaces to EMU 
logics and objectives. MoUs’ prescriptions paid little, if any, attention to the effects of 
this one-sided approach upon national social spaces’ capacity to pursue their core 
objectives, such as promoting dignity, autonomy and social justice. 
The above-described evolution has a severe impact on one of the defining features of 
the EU constitutional identity, as well as one of the main sources of legitimacy of the 
European integration process. The importance of national social spaces in this regard 
had already emerged during the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Treaty of 
Rome, where the creation of an integrated market at supranational level was conceived 
as a way to strengthen social spaces at national level. The demise of the original 
compromise led to a rethinking of the relationship between the ‘economic’ and the 
‘social’ in the EU legal order. The new configuration, enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, 
put these two sets of objectives on the same footing, imposing that conflicts and 
tensions should be resolved by finding a workable balance between the two, rather than 
ranking them hierarchically. Conversely, the transformation of national social spaces in 
adjustment variables within the EMU determines the systematic prioritisation of a 
restricted number of economic objectives over social ones, in a way that is at odds with 
the EU constitutional identity. 
It is therefore necessary to halt and reverse this transformation by recreating at 
national level the political space for an autonomous, and democratically legitimate, 
social policy. To be sure, this is not a call for a return to the stark division between the 
social sphere and the economic sphere. The original compromise is long gone and 
clearly incompatible with the very existence of a monetary union. However, it is urgent 
to emancipate national social spaces from their role of shock absorbers within the EMU 
and to open up policy space for autonomy and diversity in the social domain. This 
necessarily entails the creation of a centralised fiscal capacity to finance budgetary 
transfers212 across the Member States of the Euro area that should be made available 
beyond “the suffocating conditionality requirements contemplated today”.213 
Furthermore, there is the need to deal with the so-called “competition trap”,214 by 
setting a minimum floor of social and labour standards so to halt the dangerous race to 
the bottom and, thus, to properly deal with the legitimacy crisis currently affecting the 
European integration process. If evaluated from that angle, recent attempts at re-
socialising economic governance mechanisms are far too timid and manifestly unfit for 
the purpose.       
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